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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH
BERNARD MORSE, Defendant and Appellant.
[la-1d] Criminal Law-Punisrunent-Procedure for Determining 1 I
Penalty-Instructions.-On the penalty phase of a first de-: i
gree murder case, it was reversible error to give an instruction and to allow evidence and argument which permitted the
jury to consider the possibility that the Adult Authority might
at some future date, grant a parole to defendant if he were
given a life sentence; whether or not a prisoner is granted
parole is a matter lying within the expert judgment of the
Adult Authority, not within the jury's province, and instructions and evidence of the Authority's possible grant of parole
invite speculative argument to the jury and surmi.3e by it of
the possible improper release of a defendant to society in ti,l'
future. (Disapproving, to the extent they conflict with thi~
opinion, People v. Hamilton (1963) allte, pp. 105, 135 [32 Cal.
Rptr.4, 383 P.2d 412]; People v. Purvis (1963) ante. pp. ::123.
350 [33 Cal.Rptr. 104, 384 P.2d 424]; People v. Jack'</Jn (19i>3)
59 Ca1.2d 375, 378 [29 Ca1.Rptr. 505,379 P.2d 0371; People
v. Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal.2d 503, 543 [30 Ca1.Rpt]'. 538, 381
P.2d 394]; People v. JIodesto (1963) 59 Ca1.2(\ 722. 735 [31
Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33]; People v. Gaines (1062) 58 Ca1.2d
630,637 [25 Cal.Rptr. 448, 375 P.2d 296]; P('tJ};le Y. Lore (1961 )
56 Ca1.2d 720, 726 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.R?tr. 481, 366
P.2d 33, 809J; People v. Purvis (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 93, 96 [13
Cal.Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 713]; People v. Rolli1kl'd (HHlU) 55
Ca1.2d 88, 102 [10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 2(5); People Y.
Scotf (1960) 53 Cal.2d 558, 566 [2 Ca1.Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d
882J; People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467, 495 [341
P.2d 679J; People v. Purds (1959) 52 Cal.2d 871, 884 [346
P.2d 22]; People v. Turville (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 620, 634 [335
P.2d 678J; People v. Ward (1959) 50 Cal.2d 702, 711 [328
P.2d 777, 76 A.L.R.2d 911]; People v. F1'iend (1957) 47 Cal.
2d 749, 754 [306 P.2d 463]; People v. Ri.~er (1956) 47 Cal.2d
566, 582 [305 P.2d 1]; People v. Cr('el! (1956) 47 Col.2d 209,
216 [302 P.2d 307]; People v. Reese (1956) 47 Cal.2d 112,
116 [301 P.2d 582]; People v. Byrd (1954) 42 Ca1.2d 200,
206 [266 P.2d 505]; Peo1Jle v. Barelay (1953) 40 Ca1.2d 146,
158 [252 P.2d 321J; l'eople v. Osborn (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 380,
384 [231 P.2d 850]; cf. People v. Caelano (1047) 29 Ca1.2d
McK. Dig. References: [1-6] Criminal Law; § 1011.1; [7 J Criminal Law, § 10tiT; [8J Criminal Law, § 619(2); [9J Homicide,
§ 198; [10] lI11ullcidl'/ § 1S5; [11] Homicide, § 192; [12J Cl'iluinnl
Law, § 709.
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616 [177 P.!!d 1]; Pcople v. Lal'ane (1931) 212 Cal. 29 [291
P. 561].)
[2] Id.-Punishment-Proccdure for Determining Penalty-Instructions.-Thc original purpose in pl.'rmitting the court, on
the penalty pha:;c of a capital case, to instruct thc jury that,
if it found for life imprisonlllent ratiwr than the death pcnalty,
defendant could possihly be paroled, "'fiS to affl)rd it the pertinent facts to assist it in as;;cssing the significance of a life
sentencc.
[3] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty-Function of Jury.-On the penalty phase of a capital case, the
jury's function is to consider the facts surrounding the crime
and defendant's background and, on that b:1sis, rcach its deeision. The jury should not bc invited to decide if dcfendant
will be fit for release in the future; it should not at all be involvcd in the issue of the time, if any, when defendant should
be released; it should not be propelll'd into w(>ig-hing the possible consequences of the Adult Authority's administrative action.
[41 Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty-Function of Jury.-On the penalty phase of a capital cnse, the jury
is entitled to weigh psychiatric and other testimony as to defendant's susceptibility to rehabilitation and reformation, but
it should not attempt to appraise whether at some future date
the Adult Authority may improperly release defendant or
speculate as to whcn he might be released.
[5] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty-Instructions.-To avoid the necessity of refusing to answer.
jurors' questions relating to the effect of parole laws on a term .
of life imprisonment and to prevent latent misconceptions,
the trial court, at the time of rendition of all instructions during the pl'nalty phase of a capital case, should inform the jury
in general terms that life imprisonmcnt can result in parole·
but that such matters are of no concern to it.
[6a, 6b] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining PenaltyInstructions.-On the penalty phase of a first dcgree murder
case, it was reversible error to instruct that the trial jlld;::-e
has thc power to reduce a death penalty to a sentencc of life
imprisonment and that the jury could consider thc possihility
that the Governor could so reduce the sentence; such an instruction tends to diminish tlle jury's sense of ohli~ntion and
to mislead the jury into assuming that r(>ndition of the penalty
initiates a chain of proceedings by thc court and the Gon'l'nor
that will achieve a rewcighing of the s(>ntencc and pI)H~ihl~'
produce its nulliticA.tion. (Disapproving cnses listed in hl'allnotc
[1] to thc ('xtent they pcrmit instrudion or ar~ulllellt that thc
court or Go\-ernor lllay reduce a death sentence to life imprisonmell t.)

)

Jan. 1964]

PEOPLE V. MORSE
[60 C.2<1 631; 36 C&I.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 331

633

[7] Id.-Appeal-Reserving Questions-Instructions.-Defendant's
failure to object on the penalty phase of a first degree
murder case to an instruction telling the jury that they could
consider the possible grant of a parole to defendant by the
Adult Authority if defendant were given a life sentence, the
trial judge's power to reduce a death sentence to one of life
imprisonment, and the possibility that the Governor might
so reduce a death penalty did not foreclose defendant's opportunity to present objections to such an instruction on appeal
where, under the existing rulings relating to the subject matter of the instruction, such an objection at the trial level wouln
have been useless and unavailing.
[8] Id.-Conduct of Counsel-Concluding Arguments-Inferences
and Deductions.-Where pefendunt made conflicting statements regarding his use of drugs or narcotics at the time the
crimes were committed, it was not misconduct for the prosecutor in his concluding argument to draw an inference frolll the
evidence that defendant falsely stated that during the weekend of the crimes he had used dangerous drugs; such inferences, limited to the evidence adduced at trial, constitute proper argument.
[9] Homicide-Instructions-Intoxication.-In a first degree murder case, a refusal to instruct that expert evidence of unconsciousness resulting from voluntary intoxication is received,
not as a complete defense negating capacity to commit any
crime, but as a partial defense negating specific mental state
essential to a particular crime was not error where defendant
failed to adduce expert evidence of unconsciousness reSUlting
from voluntary intoxication, and, in fact, the expert witness'
opinion, implemented by other testimony as to defendant's
relevant behavior, defeated any possible inference of defendant's voluntary intoxication to the point of unconsciousness.
[10] Id.-Instructions-Lying in Wait.-An instruction that all
murder which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait is
murder in the first degree was justified by evidence of defendant's intention to kill and of his perpetration of his mother's
murder by means of waiting in the dark of a bedroom corridor
for the opportune moment to strike.
[l1a, 11b] Id.-Instructions-Reasonable Doubt of Degree.-In a
homicide prosecution in which defendant addressed his argument principally to the question of first or second degree murder, it was not error for the court to fail, on its own motion,
to point the instructions concerning reasonable doubt and cir[8] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Trial, § 431; Am.Jur., Trial, (1st I'd § 485).
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Lnw, §§ 73-76; Homicide, §§ 101,
102; Am.Jur., Homicide (1st ed § 550).

634

PEOPLE 'V. MORSE

[60 C.2d

cumstnntial evidence specifically to the issue of degree, rather
than defendant's right to acquittal where tlefelluant's not guilty plea n'nll\ined before the court and all matter in controversy under that plea continued as live issues before the jury,
and "'here the general instructions ns to cit'cuillstantial
evidence and reasonable doubt were implemented by an instruction apprising the jury that it should consider not merely the
issue of first degree murder or acquittal but that, in determining the degree of the crime, it should give defendant the benefit of any doubt.

[12] Oriminal Law-Instructions-Necessity for

Request.-In

criminal cases, the court must instruct tlie jury on its own
Inotion as to applicnble genernl legal principles, even though
parties fail to propose such instructions, but the court need not
render particular instructions as to specific points unless the
parties request them or they are essential to a fair trial.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. Ronald A, Abernethy, Judge. Affirmed in
part and reyerseu in part.
Proseeution for murder. Judgment of eonviction imposing the death penalty reversed insofar as it relates to the
penalty and otherwise affirmed.
William B. Enright, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, and Harelson, Enright, Von Kalinowski & Levitt for
Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, \Villiam E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and .Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TOBRINER, J.-T1lis case involves an automatic appeal
under Penal Code section 1239, subdivision (b), following
veruiets finding defendant guilty of two counts of murder in
the first degree and imposing the death pcnalty.
The three separate counts of the indictment charged defendant with the murder of his mother and sister and with
assault upon the person of one Ellen Young. To these counts
defendant entered a plea of 110t guilty and 110t guilty by
reason of insanity. Finding defendant both guilty anu sane,
the jury imposed the death penalty fur caeh of the murders.
The trial eOUl't thereafter denied defendant's motiolls for a
new trial and for reduction of penalty.
Defendant, a young man of 18V:: years, became involved,
prior to the 1IlIlrdC'rs, ill all incident with a Miss Young. He

i
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first CIH'Olllltf'rf'd her on a bus when, ill the early hours of a
Sunday morning, he was returning to his home. She alighted
from the bus, aud defendant follo\H'd her. After she had
walked several blocks, defendant accosted hcr, taking her
purse and beating ll('r about the head and shnnlclcrs. 'When
Miss Young screamed, defendant returned the purse and
apologized, but continued to molest her until she took refuge
with the occupants of a nearby dwelling.
Defendant then went to his home, where he lived with his
mother and a 12-year-old sister who suffered from cystic
fibrosis. Some\yhere outside the house he picked up a rock,
concealing it under his shirt. His mother let him into the
house. When his mother returned to her bedroom he called to
her on some pretext, anticipating that she would get out of
bed and come to the bedroom door. 'When she opened the
bedroom door he was waiting in the hall; he hit her with the
rock and killed her. The struggle awoke his sister and she
started "yelling or something"; he struck her; later he St'cured a baseball bat from the kitchen closet and beat her
until she was quiet.
When defendant related this episode to the police, he said
he had felt the urge to kill or "snuff" someone, a reeurrellt
urge with him. That night he had intended to kill his mother
as well as the girl on the bus. The identity of his victim was
of no consequence.
Aftcr the commission of the crimes, defendant roamed thc
city in the family car in search of companionship, but hc
found none. He considered and rejected suicide; he thought,
too, of the possibility of successfully disposing of the bodies
and decided that it would be futile. He did not sleep at all that
night but finally about 4 or 5 p.m. on Sunday he visited the
home of his sister-in-law, Gail :1\1orse, and her mother, :1\1rs.
Keating, whom hc informed that he had found his mother
and sister dead. Mrs. Keating sought the assistance of a
neighbor who was a police officer; he callcd other officers to
meet him, and they escorted defendant back to investigate
thc crimc scene. The officers found the bodies and the murder
weapons, the rock and a baseball bat, on the premises just ag
defendant had left them.
Defendant remained phlegmatic until one of the police officers in the car transporting him to headquarters mentioned
that he would give defendant a pencil and paper so t]lat he
might make notes to refresh his memory. Defendant responded; "I don't think that will do me any good, and
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prison won't help me. It must be something in my head."
When the officer asked whether that meant dcfendant had
committed the murders, defendant said "Yes." At the
police station defendant voluntarily responded to interrogation: the officers tape-recorded his confession; the prosecution played the tape-recording at the trial and thereafter an
officer read a transcript of its contents to the jury.
At the trial defendant recanted some of the statements h~
had made in his confession. He asserted that he had procured
narcotic drugs in Tijuana the Saturday preceding the killing
and, contrary to his earlier denial, stated that during all of
that eyening and the next day he had remained under the
influence of benzedrine and barbiturates. He denied that he
felt an urge to kill but stated that he was "bombed out"
from the effects of the drugs. He claimed that he kept this
fact from the police because at the time of his confession he
was so shaken that he wanted to die. Defendant further testified, in substance, that the crimes were not premeditated. He
said that he intended merely to steal Ellen Young's purse.
He was induced to strike his mother by her accusations when
he tripped over the doorsill that "You are going back to jail
because you are messing around with dope again." He
struck his sister to silence her screams.
\Ve consider, first, the penalty phase of the trial and explain why we have concluded that the rendition of certain
instructions, the introduction of certain evidence, and the
presentation of certain argument~ ,vorked prejudicial error.
We then examine the guilt phase of the trial and briefly
point out that defendant's four assertions of error lack
merit.
A. rhe penalty trial.
[Ia] The trial court instructed the jury that "Every person guilty of first degree murder shall suffer death or confinement in the State Prison for life in the sole discretion of
the jury.... In making your determination as to the penalty
to be imposed, you may, in exereising your discretion to
choose between different punishments, consider as a possible
consequence that the law of this State provides that a defendant sentenced either to death or life imprisolllnent may
be pardoned or haye his sentenee reduced by the Governor
and that if this defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment
he may be eligible for parole at the expiration of seven calendar years. A trial judge may also reduce the penalty from
death to life imprisonment." (CALJIC No. 306 (rev.).)
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Statistical eYi(lellce of the median and average time served
by defelldants cOIlvicted of first degree murder and of the
legal minimulll period of incarceration was presented to the
jury by means of a stipulation. 1
The qnott'll instruction illustrates the last and most extreme sta~e in a progression of instructions in the penalty
phase of capital eases. Our present concern as to the impact
of the instruction compels us to review our past rulings on
this suhj('et and to make certain that the court's statements
to the jury in its tragic task do not confuse but clarify its
undrrtaking. [2] Our original purpose in permitting the
court to instrl1('t the jury that, if it found for life imprisonment rathl'r t.han the death penalty, the defendant could possibly bc paroled,2 was to afford it the pertinent facts "to
assist it in assessing the significance of a life sentence"
1" :Mr. Stahl and I are in agreement that if Mr. Joseph Spangler of
the Bureau of Criminal Statistics in Sacramento, California, were called
to the witness stand he would testify that studies made in the previous
three year periods concerning people convicted of first degree murder
would be as follows: In the year 1959 tht:re were thirty-two cases of
persons paroled. Median time served was 136.5 months; average time
served was 144.3 months. In the year 1960 there were sixteen cases of
parole. The median time served was 139 months, the average time served
164 months. In the year 1961 there were twenty-two cases of parole. 'fhe
median time served was 141 months; average time 152 months. These
are figures for male prisoners for time served before first parole. The
absolute legal minimum for both sexes, men and women, before eligibil·
ity for parole is seven calendar years." As Justice Peters points out in
People v. Purvis (1963) ante, pp. 323, 353 [33 CaI.Rptr. 104, 384 P.2d
424J, these statistics fail to include "the basic facts involved"; they
raise a serious question of reliability in omitting "the time being served
by those stilI confined under a life sentence and not released."
2People v. Hamilton (1963) ante, pp. 105, 135 [32 CaI.Rph·. 4, 383
P.2d 412]; People v. Purvis (1963) ante, pp. 323, 350 [33 CuI.Uptr.
104, 384 P.2d 424]; People v. Jackson (1963) 59 CaI.2d 375, 378 [2!l
Cal.Rptr. 505, 379 ?2d 937]; People v. Ketchel (1963) 59, CaI.2d ;,03,
543 [30 CaI.Rptr. 538, 381 P.2d 394]; People v. Modesto (1963) 59
Cal.2d 722, 735 [31 CaI.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33]; People v. Gainc .•
(1962) 58 Ca1.2d 630, 637 [25 Cal.Rptr. 448, 375 P.2d 296]; People v.
Love (1061) 56 CaI.2d 720, 726 [16 CaI.Rptr. 777, 17 CaI.Rptr. 481, 366
P.2d 33, 800]; People v. Purvis (1961) 56 Cal.2d 93, 96 [13 CaI.Rptr.
SOl, 362 P.2d il3) ; People \'. Robi/la)'d (lD60) 55 Cal.2d 8g, 102 [10 Cal.
Rptr. 167, 3,,8 P.2d 29;,]; People ,'. Scott (1060) ;;3 CaI.2d inS, ;;66 [2
CaI.Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d 882 J; Pl'ople v. Chc$$man (l9:;() :;2 CaI.2d 467,
49ii [341 P.:!<l 679]; People v. Purvis (19i\9) 52 Ca1.2d 871, 884 [346
P.2«l 22}; ['eol'ic v. Turville (l!l,,9) ;:;1 Cal.2d 620, 634 [335 P.2<l 6i8};
l'e0l'{e v. JVarrl (l9,j!l) iiO CaI.2d 70:!, 711 [328 P.2d 77i, 76 A.L.R.:!d
!IlJ I, Prol,le \'. Friend (Ill.i7) 47 Ca1.2d H!l, 7.,4 [306 P.2d 4G3];
reopie v. Riser (l!).jr,) 47 Ca1.2«l .i!;ti, :;>\2 [31)5 P.2d 1] ; People v_
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(People v. Purvis (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 8il, 885 [346 P.2l1 22] ).3
Although such information may haY(~ beell l'l'lc\"allt. the instruction, abetted by the introductioll of eddl'lIl'(' as til the
possibility of parole, lIas brought about untoward consequences to defendants. It has brought in its wuke a tn'llll of
unremitting expansion in the scope of argument and evidence
presented to the jury that has coincidentally product'd and
augurs future confusion.
The very introduction of the fact that a prisoner senteneec}
to life imprisonment became eligible to parole after seven
years inevitably led to ramifieatiolls. Confrontc·d with this
bare instruction, defense counsel first countcred by adducing
evidence that the a\'crage and median sentcnces of d"feudants se!ltenced to life terms actually ran longer than tlte
minimum of seven years. 4 This evidence, in substance, may
have induced some juries to weigh the alternative of a sentence of a particular number of years, rathcr than a life
sentence, against the death penalty. In any event, the fear
that such was the case induced defense counsel to attl'mpt to
reassure the jury that the Adult Authority propcrly performed its task of deciding whether a defendant should be
paroled, and if so, when he should be granted parole. Thus
defense counsel developed the practice of calling offieials
from the Adult Authority as witnesses to testify to the qunlifi<'ations and bacl.ground of its membt'rsltip, the procedures:
and considerations involved in granting paroles, and the statist.ical showing of recidh'ism of prisoners released on parole.
The reaction by prosecuting attorneys to these developments took the form of an attempt to emphasize to the jury
the possibility of error by the Adult Authority and the potential grie\'ous harm that might result from the illad\'crtent
Green (1956) 47 CaJ.2d 209, 216 [302 P.2d 30iJ ; People v. Reese
(l!).j6) 47 CaJ.2d 112, 116 [301 P.2d 582J; People v. Byrd (1954) 42
Cal.2d 200, 206 [266 P.2d 505]; People v. Barclay (19i)3) 40 Cal.2d
146, Vi8 [2;)2 P.2d 321); People \'. Osool"n (IV51) 37 Cal.2tl 380, 384
r231 P.2d 8iiO] ; d. People "1'. Caetano (1947) 29 Ca1.2d 616 [177 P.2d
1]; People v. LaVerne (1931) 212 Cal. 20 [297 P. 561].
aWe set forth typical expressions of the cases: " ... [T]he Court may
instruct the jury as to the consequences of the different penalties that
may be imposed 80 that an intelligent decision may be made." People v.
Barclay (l9ii3) 40 Cal.2d 146, 1ii8 [2ii2 P.2d 321]. "The quoted rules
are pertinent as matters of fact to be considered in determining the
pennlty••.. " People v. Friend (19ii7) 47 Ca1.2d 749, 755 [306 P.2d
463].
4E.g., People v. Byrd (1954) 42 Cal.2d 200 [260 P.2d 505]; PeopZe v.
Barclay (1953) 40 Cal.2d 146 [2ii2 P.2d 321J •
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parol(\ of a defcndant convicted of murder. Thus tIle apparently innocuous stt'p of giving instructions of the operation
of thc parole laws has resulted in the jury's attempted evaluation of the competency of the Adult Authority to administer the parole system. The jury sometimes lamentably has
"tl'it'u" the Adult Authority (People v. Purvi.s (1963) ante,
pp. 323, 332 [33 Cal.Rptr. 104, 384 P.2d 424]).
Concomitantly with permitting instructions as to the parole laws, this court accepted the procedure of informing the
jury tl1at thc Governor could exercise the power, among other
things, of reducing a death penalty to life imprisonment. 1i
Thc trend in this direction, which, as we shall develop more
fully infra, may well tend to reduce the jury's sense of. responsibility, was l1alted momentarily in People v. Linden
(1959) 52 Ca1.2d 1 [338 P.2d 397]. Linden held it improper
to inform the jury about automatic appeals in death penalty
cases. The pres:mt case, however, indicates that the thrust of
expansion has fully resumed. Here the jury has been informed as to the trial judge's power to reduce a death penalty to life imprisonment.
In the recent case of People v. Purvis (1963) ante, pp.
323,352 [33 Cal.Rptr. 104,384 P.2d 424], we expressed serious
doubt as to the reliability of statistics to show the probabilities that a sentence of life imprisonment will result in parole
or to indicate the time when the Adult Authority will, if at
all, grant parole. Thus far we have not been confronted with
a case in which statistics and evidence have been introduced
to show the probabilities of the trial judge's reduction of a
death sentence or of the Governor's exercise of his power of
commutation. If the present trend continues such cases surely
will arise.
\Vhen we opened the door a slight crack to allow an instruction, and to admit an evidentiary showing, as to the
realistic consequence of a sentence of life imprisonment, we
had in mind a limited and legitimate objective. But various
maneuvers haye pushcd the door so widely ajar that too
many confusing elements have entered the courtroom. The
ISPeople v. Chessman (1059) 52 Ca1.~ci 467, 495 [341 P.2d 670];
People v. Turville (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 620, 63! [335 P.2d 678]; Pcople v.
Ward (19;;8) 50 CII.1.2d 702, 711 [3~8 P.2ci 777, 76 A.L.R.2d 911];
People v. Friend (I05i) 47 Ca1.2d 749, 7,,4 [306 P.2d 463]; People v.
Biscr (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 566, 582 [305 P.2d 1]; People v. Byrd (1054)
42 Ca1.2d 200,207 [266 P.2d 505].
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time has arrived for specifying the matters that the jury
SllOUld consider.
Before turning to a specific analysis of the ca.'1e as it is now
presented to us, we note the current posture of the decisions.
As to the issue of presenting to the jury the possibilities of
parole, California now stands in a striking minority position
among other jurisdictions,' although our earlier cases appeared more in accord with the majority. '1 With regard to
instructing the jury as to the trial judge's power to reduce
sentence, prior decisions of this court, as we shall later ex'Lawley v. State (1956) 264 Ala. 283 [87 So.2d 433); Scarber v.
State (1956) 226 Ark. 503 [291 S.W.2d 241]; Sukle v. People (1941)
107 Colo. 269 [111 P.2d 233); Broyles v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1954)
267 S.W.2d 73 [47 A.L.R.2d 1252]; State v. Hefl,ry (1940) 196 La. 217
[198 So. 910); State v. White (1958) 27 N.J. 158 [142 A.2d 65]; Bea"
v. State (1936) 58 Okla.Crim. 432 [54 P.2d 675]; Graham v. State
(1957) 202 Tenn. 423 [304 S.W.2d 622J [prosecutor's argument); Wil·
liams v. State (1950) 191 Tenn. 4.')6 [234 S.W.2d 993) [trial court's
instruction) ; Coward v. Commo"IL"l'alth (193;:;) 164 Va. 639 [178 S.E.
797]. See Lovely v. United States (4th Cir. 1948) 169 F.2d 386; WilBoft,
v. State (1956) 212 Ga. 157 [91 S.E.2d 16]; Farrell v. People (1890)
133 Ill. 244 [24 N.E. 423]; State v. Junkins (1910) 147 Iowa 588 [126
N.W. 689]; Jacobs v. State (1913) 103 Miss. 622 [60 So. 723]; State v.
Quilling (1953) 363 1\10. 1016 [2;:;6 S.W.2d 751); Grandsinger v. State
(1955) 161 Neb. 419 [73 N.W.2d 632]; State v. Conner (1955) 241 N.C.
468 [85 S.E.2d 584]; Liska v. State (1926) 115 Ohio St. 283 [152 N.E.
667]; State v. Thorne (1912) 41 L'tllh 414 r126 P. 286, Ann.Cas. 1915D
90]; Jones v. Commonu'ealth (1952) 194 Va. 273 [72 S.E.2d 693, 35
A.L.R.2d 761); State v. Carroll (193;) 52 Wyo. 29 [69 P.2d 542]; cf.
Deming v. State (1956) 235 Ind. 282 [133 N.E.2d 51]; Commonwealth
v. Johnson (1951) 368 Pa. 139 [81 A.2d 569]. Contra, Sullit'an v. State
(1936) 47 Ariz. 224 [55 P.2d 312); State v. Buttry (1939) 199 Wash.
228 [90 P.2d 1026); State v. Shau'cn (1894) 40 W.Va. 1 [20 S.E. 873].
See also Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion 111 Capital Cases (1953)
101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1099, 1118; Comment (19:.i4) 54 Colum.L.Rev. 946,956·
951'; Comment (1953) 39 Va.L.Rev. 85; Comment (1953) 10 Wash. '"
Lee L.Rev. 29; NotA 35 A.L.R.2d 769.
'1The case of first impression in California apparently was People v.
Reilly (1929) 208 Cal. 385 [281 P. 606) in which this court did not
indicate particular favor towards the present position. The prosecutor
had argued to the effect that it was a matter of common knowledge that
a sentence of life imprisonment means that a defendant will serve from
seven to ten years and then be "turned out" on society. This court
stated" [I]t is unfortllnate that such overzealous argument sometimes
occurs in the course of a criminal trial, but no objection was made
thereto nor was any r~qucst made that the jury should be admonished to
disregard this statement, and, in view of the entire record in this case,
we cannot say that a different result would have follo\ved had this
statement been omittcd." (208 Cal. at p. 387; italics added.) Seo
People v' LaVerne (1931) 212 Cal. 29 [297 P. 561).
In People v. Letourn~au (1949) 34 Cal.2d 4i8 [211 P.2d 865), the
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plain in more drtail, indicat.e that such instl"Uetion constitutes error in that it tends to reduce thc jury's sense of
responsibility in imposing thc death penalty.
\Ye turn to an analysis of these two basic aspects of the
problem: the instruction, evidence and argument as to the
role of the Adult Authority, and the instruction as to the
roles of the trial judge and the Governor.
jury, nfter a period of deliberation, inquired in writing of the trial
court: " 'Does the imposition of "imprisonment in the State prison for
the term of his natural life" allow of later pardon or parole and
possible release? I The trial judge stnted, 'that is something that is a
matter for the Court. It is not, in the processes of law, a matter for
:rour consideration •.• and we will not answer it.' " This court stated:
"This reply was in part correct; tile possibility of pardon or parole teal!
not for the jUr)"s consideration. '" It does not appear that defendant
could hm'e bc('n prejudiced by the fact that the trial judge, in a strictly
technienl scnse, erroneously stated that the questions were 'for the
Court' wherens the question of pardon is (at least Ultimately) for the!
Governor ••. nnd the question of parole is for the Adult Authority, the
power of whieh is defined by the Legislature..•• " (34 Ca1.2d at pp. 493·
494; Italics ndded.) Unlike the more recer.t cases cited supra, Letour· l
neau expressell no distinction between the issues of guilt and penalty as
to tbe propriety of the jury considering parole. The court concluded
with the statement: "But we must presume that the jury followed the
instruetion which for~ade its being influenced by conjecture or public
feeling, and accepted the judge's statement that is was not to eonsider
the possibility of pardon or parole. (See People -. Ferlin (1928) 203
Cal. 587, 600 [265 P. 230]; People v. Anderson (1932) 120 Cal.App. 5,
8 [7 P.2d 202].)" (34 Cal.2d at p. 494.) The court thus approves of
the prior decisions prohibiting the jury's consideration of the possibility
of pardon or parole.
In People v. IIoyt (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 306, 311 [125 P.2d 2()], the jury
inquired if a life imprisonment meant possible parole. The trial court
answered" You hayc nothing to do with that." A juror then asked for
"a definition of life imprisonment. " The trial court answered "All I
can tell you it is impri~onmcllt in the penitentiary for the period of
natural life. Wllat is done later by the aut1iorities is nOM of our
concern." t;pholdillg the propriety of the trial court's remarks, this
eOllrt noted that such statements could not be construed as suggesting to
the jury that life imprisonment mennt parole in a manner that caused
the jury improperly to impose the death penalty. In People v. Ramo8
(1935) 3 Cal.2d 269 [44 P.2d 301], the jury inquired for information
"in regard to the penalty if a man is given life imprisonment." (P.
272.) The dcfcndant did not object, and the eourt gave information
describing the parolc system. This court pointcd out, "The action of the
eourt was an irregularity that has been many times condemned by this
eourt." (P. 273.) While the court did not reverse, it stated that the
instruction to the jury should hllve 'I stopped" aft!'r telling them that
first degree murder entitles the jury to choose between the sentences of
life imprisonment or death. See People v. Ba1llirC6 (1934) 1 Ca1.2d 559,
564·565 (36 P.2d 628].
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1. Instruction, evidcllce and argumcnt as to Adult Authority's possible grant of parole.
[lb] Although the Legislature has, through the Adult
Authority, sought to provide for the rehabilitation of eriminal defendants, it has coincidentally retained the death penalty and left its administration to the unguided discretion of
the jury. In the general field of criminal law the Legislature
has abandoned the ancient notion of categorical punishment,
the infliction of fixed terms for certain crimes, and substituted the indeterminate sentence, leaving to the Adult
Authority the judgment of the period of incarceration. s The
Authority does not fix that period pursuant to a formula of
punishment,9 but in accordance with the adjustment and

)

BAs Justice Schauer has pointed out in People v. Friend (1957) 47
Ca1.2d 749, 763 (fn. 7) [306 P.2d 463]: " ... This state has long siuce ;
accepted the view (as recognized lind implemented by the indeterminate
sentence laws and other acts) that, generally speaking, punishment
should be fitted to the perpetrator of the crime, not merely the crime •
• •. " The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. State of New York
(1949) 337 U.S. 241, 24i et seq. [69 S.Ct. 107£1, 93 L.Ed. 1337] has
recognized the validity of the same principle: "Undoubtedly the New
York statutes emphasize a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that
the punishment should fit the offender lind not merely the crime. People
v. Johnson, 252 N.Y. 38i, 3v2 [169 ~.E. 619, 6211. The belief no longer
prevails that every offense in a like legal clItegory call for an identical
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular
offender. This whole country has traveled far from the period in which
the death sentence was nn automatic and commonplace result of com·ic·
tions-even for offenses tollay dc·cmed trivial. ••. Retribution is no
longer the dominant objecth·e of the criminal law. Reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
jurisprudence." See Roberts v. Duffy (1014) 167 Cal. 629, 634 (140 P.
260); People v. Denne (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 409 (297 P.2d 451]; but
see Pen. Code, § 209.
9Section 5079 of the Penal Code states that the director of corrections
shall pro\·ide for a psychiatric and diagnostic clinic and that" The work
of the clinic shall include a scientific stuJy of each prisoner, his career
and life history, the cause of his criminal acts alld recommendations for
his care, training anll employment with a view to his reformation an,l to
the protection of society .... " Indeed, the early case of Roberts v.
Duffy (1914) 167 Cal. 6::!9, 634 [140 P. 260J explains that the" purpose
and object of a parole system is to mitigate the rigor of the olel, and
while requiring the punishment of a prisoner by actual confinement for a
fixed period of his term of sentence, still to provide a more humane
management and prison discipline under which there is extended to those
who may show a disposition to reform and whose reformation may
reasonably be ex pee ted, a hope and prospect of liberation from the
prison walls under the restrictions and conllitions of II parole. It recog·
nill's, that notwithstanding the commission of crime requires a. measure
of imprisonment as a penalty, still that the interests of society require
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social rehabilitation of the individual analyzed as a human
composite of intellectual, emotional and genetic factors.
Hence the jury, in this whole field of crime, docs not determine the penalty; the task of deciding the term of incarceration lies with an expert body. Yet in the instance of capital
crime the jury must perform the fUIlction of defining punishment, which, in this casc, includes the tremendous sanction of
the death penalty.
The jury's task assumes formidable proportions because it
far transcends the usual function of finding whether or not
certain eyents occurred and certain consequellces resulted
from them. The jury in this instance performs no such circumscribed taRk; it must in each particular case, depending
wholly on the kind of defendant and nature of facts before
it, decide the issue of life or death. In reaching its crucial
decision, although Penal Code section 190.1 states it may
consider "facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty, " the jury has no guidelines, no standards, no criteria.
The Legislature has reposed in the jury a wide and onerous
task, aggraYated by this conflict in function and philosophic
background. (People v. Ham·ilton (1963) ante, pp. 105, 136
[32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412].)
The objectiYe situation is difficult enough without blurring
the functions. [3] The function of the jury is to consider
the facts surrounding the crime and defendan t 's back-,
ground, and upon that basis, reach its decision. The jury.
should not be invited to decide if the defendant will be fit for:
release in the future; it should not at all be involved in the
issue of the time, if any, when the defendant should be released; it should not be propellcd into weighing the possible
consequences of the Authority's administrative action.
.
The vice of placing such issues before the jury reaches
deeper than the promulgation of confusion; it frames questions that no human mind can answer, and it, in substance,
transposes the task of the Adult Authority to the jury.
The questions are unanswerable because they rest upon
future eyents which are unpredictable. The jury's attention
may be focused, as it was here, upon whether the Authority
will releasc the defendal1t into society at some ullcertain <late
in the future, such as "eight, niue, ten years from now."
tbat under prison discipline e,"ery effort should be made to produce a
rcl'ol'matiOIl of the I'ri~on"r. and proper lI1('astlres adoptl'u 80 that this
D1Uy he ac('ompiisLed ..•• "
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Based upon what defendant lllay then be, the jury is aslH'd
whether it thinks defendant should at that time be l'\'leased
to society. Premised upon the unlmown, the qucstion asks fOI'
an answer that cannot be intellig('lltly rendered. The JUI'Y i~
precipitated into a judgment upon the imponderable.
To propose such questions to the jury is to prescnt to it
problems that the Legislature has entl'ustNl for solutiol1 to
the Adult Authority. The IJegislature established the Authority as a specialized body, aided by a trained staff. to decide
such questions. It reaches its decisions after the prisoner has
received treatment at a corrective institution, has bl'en carefully supervised and has been afforded an opportunity to
attempt to understand llis maladjustment. From ~'NlI'S of nnnotated observation of the defendant tIle Authority can render an informed prognosis as to his potential. The jUl'Y, on
the other hand, must plunge into a judgm('nt bas('d upon
conjecture; it must attempt to perform a function whir:h the
Legislature expressly granted to another institution and impliedly denied to it.
The final and most dangerous error of permitting the jury
to consider the Authority's possible gt'ant of parole is to illduce it to pass judgment upon the very issue foreclosed to it
and to prCL'cnt the proper body from deciding the is.<me at
the proper time. The jury can conclude tllat the Authority
will improperly grant defendant parole in the futurl'; it rna:\"
fear that the Adult Authority will permit a "daugerous"
defendant to walk the streets; it may then foredose th /!
anthority from ever granting parole by imposing the death
penalty. The jury would thus improperly preempt the wholH
parole system and defeat the legislative design. The jury
would then utilize the death penalty for fear that the Adult
Authority will not properly perform the function that the
Legislature has specifically delegated to it.lo
The vices which we have described above find dramatic
illustration in the prosecutor's argument to the jury in the
instant case: "And I frankly believe, based on the evidence
that we have heard here, that he is never going to change.
Twelve years from now, or seven, eight, nine, ten years from
lOAs one writer put it, "[T]he fact that a person sentenced for life
might be released before he may safely be returned to society indicates
a weakness in the parole system-not that he ought to have been excute!!." (Knowlton, Problems 01 Jury Discretion in Capita! Cases
(1953) 101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1099, 1119.) See 1" re Lee (1918) 177 Cal. 690,
693 [171 P. 9;)9].
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now, when he comes up for consideration do you honestly
think that he is going to have changed one little bit T Do yon
honestly feel that if he gets the thought in his mind that he
would like to kill somebody that he hi going to be any
different' ... It is true that when they consider him for
parole they are going to consider the fact that he killed two
people. No question about that. But that's llO guarantee that
he is not going to be back on the street in the average time,
or even less than the average time. That's what we have got
to face. That's the reality. "
\Ye have pointed out that the majority of other jurisdictions hold that the possibility of parole is not a proper matter
for the jury's consideration in the instant situation. \Ve turn
to an exposition of the reasoning of some of these cases.
The leading case on the subject demonstrates that we
would not be the first jurisdiction to reconsider its earlier
position on the point. In a learned opinion by Chief Justice.
\Veintraub the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. White.
(1958) 27 N.J. 158 [142 A.2d 65], overruled a body of settled
law that had been reaffirmed in numerous cases during an
interim of oyer 40 years. The court in White stated that·
"upon a re-appraisal of the problem, we cannot escape the
conclusion that the course heretofore approved is erroneous." (P. 72 [142 A.2d].) On the merits of the issue White
held that" [T] he Legislature committed to the jury the responsibility to determine in the first instance whether punishment should be life or death. It charged another agency
with the responsibility of deciding how a life sentence shall
be executed. The jurors perform their task completely when
they decide the matter assigned to them upon the evidence
before them. \Vhat happens thereafter is no concern of theirs.
It is no more proper for a jury to conclude that death be the
penalty because a life sentence may be commuted or the defendant paroled, than it would be for a trial judge in other
criminal causes deliberately to impose an excessive sentence
to frustrate the statutory scheme committing parole to
another agency." (142 A.2d at p. 76.)
Broyles v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1954) 267 S.W.2d 73 [47
A.L.R.2d 1252], involved a case in which the jury exercised
the duty of fixing the sentence. The prosecutor argued to the
jury that a life sentence meant the possibility of parole after
eight years, that a 21-year sentence meant the possibility of
parole after six years, and tllat defendant was eligible f(,l'
parole after the expiration of one-third of any sentence of
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less than 10 years. In holding such an argument to be prejudicial error, the Kentucky court stated: " [U] nder our theory
of separation of governmental powers, it is the duty of the
judiciary to obtain a conviction of those guilty of crime. But
once that conviction has been obtained and sentencc imposed,
it is the duty of other departments of government to enforce
the sentence and to determine when and under what circumstances the prisoner will be eligible for release. Therefore,
when the judiciary attempts to anticipate the rules of the
legislative and executive departments relating to the parole
of prisoners and attempts, in effect, to circumvent those rules
it infringes upon the prerogatives of other departments of
government." (267 S.W.2d at p. 76.)
In lYilliams v. State (1950) 191 Tenn. 456 [234 S.W.2d
993], the responsibility of choosing between the death penalty and life imprisonment likewise was reposed in the jury.
The Tennessee Supreme Court found prejudicial error in the
trial court's discussion of parole laws with the jury; the
court emphasized that the jury could not properly inflict the
death penalty only because it opposed the defendant's possible parole under a life sentence. (See Graham v. State (1957)
202 Tenn. 423 [304 S.W.2d 622].)
The appellate court found prcjudicial error in Sukle v.
People (1941) 107 Colo. 269 [111 P.2d 233], a case in which
the jury, after being instructed that life imprisonment meant
possible parole, rendered a death penalty verdict. The court
stated that the jury was encouraged "to speculate on what
the chicf executive of the state, at some future time, acting
pursuant to authority of law apart from the law under which
the judiciary proceeds, might then conclude justice required
at his hands. Prejudicial error is obvious." (P. 235 [111
P.2d].)
In reversing a rape conviction which involved only imprisonment, and not the death penalty, as here, the court in
Lawley v. State (1956) 264 Ala. 283 [87 So.2d 433], stated
that" [I] n arriving at a proper sentence to be imposed on a
defendant, the proportionate part thercof which probably or
possibly might be deducted therefrom by the Parolc Board
was not a proper factor to be considered by the jury, and it
is error for the court to instruct the jury as to the laws or
customs governing the granting of paroles. '" It is reasonable to assume that the jury wished to punish the dcfendant
by having him serve a certain number of years in the pcnitentiary and in order to insure that he serve that length of
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time, the jury was planning to add to the length of the
sentence in order to compensate for a parole before the entire
sentence was served." (87 So.2d at pp. 434-435.)
In view of these considerations we turn to the delicate
problem of delineating the function of the jury in the penalty phase of the case and determining the kind of instructioll
that should be given to it. "We have stated that elllighteneJ
legislation in California has advanced the treatment of criminals from the stage of mechanical punishment, based exclusively upon the crime, to an appraisal of the indiYidnnl
wrongdoer for the purpose of his possible reformation. Til"
emphasis must be upon the individual rather than th,>
offense; such insistence upon the importance of the iudi ddual symbolizes a basic value of our society that contrasts with
a totalitarian denigration of the individual as an appeIHlag:'
of the state. Our insistence upon the dignity and worth of
the individual must surely be strictly and steadfastly applic,l
in the crucial context of the individual's life or death.
The jury decides whether the individual should be permitted to live upon the basis of a complete and careful analysis
of that person as a human composite of emotional, psychological and genetic factors. The jury looks at the individual as a
whole being and determines if he is fit to live. [4] The jury
is entitled to weigh psychiatric and other testimony as to his
susceptibility to rehabilitation and reformation. It should
not, however, attempt to appraise whether at some future
date the Adult Authority may improperly release the defendant or speculate as to when he might be released.
[5] In evolving a proper instruction for the jury, we recognize that individual jurors often entertain some ideas of
parole laws and might erroneously consider the effect of such
laws upon a term of life imprisonment. They may ask the
trial judge for information upon the subject; it is not enough
for the trial court merely to refuse the request and relegate
them to ignorance. To avoid such unanswered queries and to
prevent latent misconceptions, we believe the trial court, at
the time of rendition of all instructions, should inform the
jury in general terms that life imprisonment can result in
parole but that such matters are of no concern to it. l l
llMany of the jurisdictions that hold it improper for a jury to
consider the possibility of parole in deciding punishment do not finrl
error in instructions or arguments relating to parole so long as the trial
court specifies that this subject is not a mntter for consideration or
speculation by the jury. E . g., Lee v. State (19,)7) 265 Ala. 623 [93
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Vote set forth the following instruction for the general guid.
ance of the trial court: "A sentence of life imprisonment
means that the prisoner may be paroled at some time durillg
his lifetime or that he may spend the remainder of his
natural life in prison. An agency known as the Adult Au·
thority is empowered by statute to determine if and when a
prisoner is to be paroled, and under the statute no prisoner
can be paroled unless the Adult Authority is of the opinion
that the prisoner when released will assume a proper place in
society and that his release is not contrary to thc welfare of
Rociety. A prisoner released on parole may remain on parole
for the balance of his life and if he violates the terms of the
parole he may be returned to prison to serve the life sentence.
"So that you willl1ave no misunderstandings relating to a
sentence of life impri!'lonment, you have been informed as to
the general scheme of our parole system. You are now in.
structed, however, tl1at the matter of parole is not to be con·
sidered by you in determining the punishment for this de·
fendant, and you may 110t speculate as to if, or when, parole
would or would not be granted to him. It is not your function to decide now whether this man will be suitable for
parole at some future date. So far as you are concerned, you
are to decide only whether this man shall suffer the death
penalty or whether he shall be permitted to remain alive. If
upon consideration of the evidence you believe that life imprisonment is the proper sentence, you must assume that
those officials charged with the operation of our parole
Rystem will perform their duty in a correct and responsible
manner, and that they will nut parole this defendant unless
he can be safely released into society. It would be a violation
of your duty as jurors if you were to fix the penalty at death
because of a doubt that the Adult Authority will properly
carry out its responsibilities. "
[Ie] In the light of the foregoing discussion we disap·
So.2d 757] ; State v. Conner (1955) 241 N.C. 468 [85 S.E.2d 584];
State v. Whitll (1958) 27 N.J. 158 [142 A.2d 65]; Li8ka v. Statll
(1926) 115 Ohio St. 283 [1'i2 N.E. 6oil. In State v. White, supra, the
court set torth a proposed model instruction similar to that ineorporated
in this opinion. Some jurisdictions hold it improper even to mention or
discuss the parole laws. lllcKuhen v. State (1960) 102 Ga.App. 75 [IVi
S.E.2d 625]; sce Williams v. State (1950) 191 Tenn. 456 [234 S.W.2d
993]; ct. People v. Burgard (1941) 377 Ill. 322 [36 N.E.2d 558); Davis
v. State (1959) 168 Tex. Crim Rep. 72 [328 S.W.2d 76,3.1 See generally,
Comment (1936) 15 Stan.L.Re\'. 349; Comment (19:)3) 10 Wash. & Lee
L.Rev.219.
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prove of CAIJJIC No. 306 (rev.) and the dcei~ions set forth
in footnote 2, supra, to the extent that they conflict with this
opinion.
2. Instruction as to the trial judge's and Gfwernnr's possible reduction of the death penalty.
[6a] We believe that the instruction that the trial judge I
has the power to reduce a death penalty to a sentence of lif~ I
imprisonment may very well induce the jury to assume that
its finding for the death penalty merely initiates a series of
procedures which invoke a reconsideration of the penalty and
which may result in its reduction to life imprisonment.
Since the jury undertakes the task of assessing the penalty
in the wide latitude of absolute discretion and in the absence
of statutory guide lines, the suggestion that big-her authorities will review its decision must profoundly nlIct·t it. Up'liI
the delicate scale of unbounded determination we add a lie\\'
but definite weight. The impact of the instruction must Ih'\··
essarily weaken the jury's own sense of respollsibilit~·. Yet
nothing should be introduced to the jury to detract from it~
most careful consideration of the choice of penalty. 'l'hat
effort should not be adulterated by the illfusioll of foreign
and deflecting factors.
In previous cases we have condemned the introdu('tinn of
considerations of less consequence than iustructiolls which
have brought to the jury's attention a postst'ntendllg po:,sibility that might diminish its sensitivity to its task. In People v. Linden (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 1 [~38 P.2d 8!l7J, we found
error in the prosecutor's argument that, •. in California w'!
have a law that where a death penalty is imposed . . . it.
goes immediately to the Supreme Court of t.he State of California. They review your decisioll if a tll'nth penalty is im·
posed, and they determine from the law w1l('thor such a
penalty is justified, or if they believe the eddence is such that
only a second-degree murdt'r ,\'as conll11ittl'd, or they could determine tl1at there was prej llrlieial error. " (32 Cal.2d at p. 26.)
In condemning this type of argument, Lil/dclI stated that "a
jury should approach the tasks of fillding facts and eX(>l'('isill~
discretion as to choice of pl'nalty with appl'(>l,jatioll that theil'
duties are serious and that they are accoulltable for th(>i r
decisions, not with the f(>('ling that tIH"\' are mitkin!! me,'!'
tentative determinations which thc COUl'ts ('an (,llI"'(,(·t. Th~
jury have 110 COIICCI'II It'ith alld shollid nof be ill!nrlllf'tl Hf tllf'
automatic (1/1/1(,0/ II'hr/'c .illd'III/·f'lIt of drill" is impo,w'ri. lind o[
course they should not be misillfol'Dl(,u (as they illfereutially
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were here) concerning this court's powers. Argument such as
that of the deputy district attorncy above quoted improperly
dimillishes the jury's recognition of their duties and responsibilities and powcrs." (52 Ca1.2d at pp. 26.27; italics
added.)
While Linden relied upon two propositions, the second,
and more significant, developed the danger of involving the
jury in matters with which it had no concern. The eourt first
explained that the argument misinforllled the jury as to the
power of this court. In particular, the contention improperly
implied that this court could substitute its judgment as to
choice of punishment. Thus Lilldell stated that "of course
they should not be misinformed . . . concerning this court's
powers." The court's second and more basic point was simply
that the automatic appeal in death penalty cases should be of
no concern to the jury, since to inform it of the possibility of
this appeal improperly diminished its own sense of responsibility.
The latter reasoning in Linden finds support in People v.
Sampsell (1950) 34 Ca1.2d 757 [214 P.2d 813], in which case
the prosecutor argued that "the State of California has what
is known as an automatic appeal in a death case, and it is not
entirely your responsibility. YOllr verdict must be approved
in a death case by the Supreme COllrt of the State of California ... to be sure that the Supreme Court is in agreement
with your verdict. So it is not all your responsibility." (34
Ca1.2d at p. 762.) Of this argument the court said "the district attorney's remarks concerning the function of this
court where an automatic appeal is taken ... constitute reprehensible conduct which is not to be condoned." (ld. at p~
765.)
If Linden and Sampsell condemn the argument which may
diminish the jury's sense of responsibility, the instruction
whieh works that result is necessarily erroneous. 'Vords of
instruction of the trial judge are more likely to effect prejudice than the words of argument of the prosecutor. Moreover,
if the jury cannot be told of the automatic appeal which docs
not enable the Supreme Court to reduce the penalty, it
should not be told of a procedure which permits the trial
court to change with finality the very decision rendered by
the jury.
The recent ease of People v. Ashley (1063) 59 Cal.2d 339,
[29 Cal.Rptr. 16, 379 P.2d 496], does not affl'ct the r\llings of
Linden and Sampsell. The defendant in Ashley, an automatic
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appeal case, argu('d that the pr('~ellt instruction effected error
because it misled tll(' jury in failing to add that the court is
empowereu to reduce the sentence only if defendant moYes
for a !lew trial. Although in A.shley we noted the technical
inadeqnacy of the instruction, we found that the error could
not possibly have misled the jury. The Ashley opinion neither cites Linden on this point nor passes upon thc instant
argument that the possibility of the court's reduction of the
sentence should not concern the jury because of its tendency
to reduce the jury's sense of responsibility. Thus Ashley
considers only one of the grounds discussed in Linden, namely the error in misinforming or misleading the jury as to the
actual post-conviction procedures, and does not discuss the
second and separate ground relating to the impropriety of a
correct instruction as to the automatic appeal. .Justice Peters
summarizes by stating, "the jury could not possibly have
been misled, by the technical incompleteness of the instruction." (59 Cal.2d at p. 365; italics added.)
The theoretical considerations which lie behind the prohibition of the introduction of alien matters in the guilt phase
of the trial may very well apply to the penalty phase. In the
guilt phase the accepted rules forbid the jury from resolving
doubts in favor of conviction upon the hypoth('sis that an
appeal can cure the possible error or that the defendant may
obtain parole or a pardon. Indeed, the clear weight of authority holds that the jury should not reach a compromise of the
issue of guilt and find a conviction because appeal may cure
this error,12 or because the Governor may grant a pardon, IS
or because a defpndant may obtain a light sent('nce or parole. 14 California decisions accord with this view. 15
Some cases extend this philosophy to the function of the
12United States v. Fiorito (7th Cir. 1962) 300 F.::!d 424; Blackwell v.
State (1918) 76 Fla. 124 [79 So. 731, 1 A.L.R. 502]; Kelly v. State
(1936) 210 Ind. 380 [3 N.E.2d (};"i] ; State v. Kring (I8n) 64 Mo. 591 ;
State v. Biggerstaff (1896) 17 Mont. 510 [-!3 P. 709]; People v.
Johnson (1940) ::!84 N.Y. 182 [30 N.E.2d 465, 132 A.L.R. 675]; State v.
Clark (1961) 2~7 Ore. 391 [362 P.2d 33;,]; Gray v. State (1950) 191
Tenn. 526 [235 S.W.Zd 20]; Crow v. State (1894) 33 Tex.Crim.Rep. 264
[26 S.W. 209].

13Commonu:calth v. Mills (lV-t4) 3':;0 Pa. 476 [39 A.2d 572].
14People v. Suhlol (1926) 3~2 II!. 540 [153 N.E. 727]; Pollard v.
State (1929) 201 Ind. 180 [166 N.E. 654] ; State v. Tennant (1927) 204
Iowa 130 [214 N.W. 708]; Shoemaker v. State (1%1) 228 Md. 462 [180
A.2d 682]; cf. People v. Sherwood (W36) 271 N.Y. 427 [3 N.E.2d
581].

lIIE.g., People v. Riser (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 566 [305 P.2d 1).
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jury in general, including thc imposition of sent('nce, and
broadly forbid the presentation of matters that may weaken
the juror's sense of responsibility.16 Thus, on the specific
point of imposing the death penalty, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in State v. J[01l1lt (1959) 30 N. J. 195 [152 A.2d
343J, lleld that the court improperly iustructed the jury that
itc; choice of the death penalty was not nccessarily conclusive.
The court stated that "when the trial court interrupted to
stress that the jury's omission of a recommendation would
not necessarily mean death to the defendant because' we have
appeal courts and everything else, so a lot of things could
happen,' .,. it tended to dilute the jury's crucial sense of
responsibility." (152 A.2d at p. 351.) The North Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Little (1947) 228 N. C. 417 [45
S.E.2d 542], found prejudicial error in the prosecutor's ar- I
gument that even if the defendant were sentenced to death
there would be a 40 percent chance that his sentence would .
be commuted to life. (See State v. Hawley (1948) 229 N. C.
167 [48 S.E.2d 35].)
Concluding for the foregoing reasons that the iustruction
improperly called to· the jury's attention the judge's power
to reduce the death sentence to life imprisonment, we note
that the instruction additionally stated that the jury could
also consider the possibility that the Governor could so reduce the sentence. The vice of the latter instruction parallels
that of the former. Both statements tend to diminish the
jury's sense of obligation; they both infuse into the issue
factors that do not belong there. To the extent that previous
cases permit instruction or argument that the court or Governor may reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment, they
erroneously permit the importation of extraneous matter to
the jury rooms; they should accordingly be disapproved. l1
We have no doubt that these errors in directing the attention of the jury to the roles of Adult Authority, judge and
Governor, by means of argument, evidence and instruction in
the instant case, prejudicially influenced the jury. Moreover,
after deliberating for one day, the jury specifically asked "to
hear again the court's instructions re the third phase, in
1eState v. Mount (1959) 30 N.J. 195 [152 A.2d 343] ; PeopZ8 v.
Johnson (1940) 284 N.Y. 182 [30 N.E.2d 465, 132 A.L.R. 675) ; State
v. Little (1947) 228 N.C. 417 [45 S.E.2d 542); Gray v. State (1950)
191 Tenn. 526 [235 S.W.2d 20] ; see United States v. Fiorito (7th Cir.
1962) 300 F.2d 424.
17 See in. 5, BUprG.
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clarification of reference to possible consequences." The
court then reread the above-mentioned instruction. The jury
then asked additional questions relating to the alternative
death or life sentences. Thus the jury, while deliberating
upon the death penalty, was aware of, and had repeatcd to it,
the facts concerning the roles of the Adult Authority, the
trial judge and the Governor. Furthermore, the trial court
affirmath'ely instructed the jury that it could consider these
facts. Whatever the reasons this court might have found in
the record in Linden "to avoid an otherwise indicated reversal," we find in the record here no justification for concluding that the error was not prejudicial insofar as concerns the
fixing of penalty. To the contrary, after examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence, we are of the opinion
that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
defendant as to penalty would have been reached in the absence of the error.
[7] In view of the prior decisions as to the subject matter
of the instruction, defendant's failure to object to it should
not foreclose his opportunity to present these issues on appeal. Such an objection at the trial level under the existing
rulings would have been useless and unavailing.
[6b] In conclusion, we believe that the instructions as to
the judge's and Governor's possible reduction of the death
penalty tend to mislead the jury into assuming that the ren- i
dition of the penalty initiates a chain of proceedings by the
court and the Governor which will achieve a reweighing of
the sentence and possibly produce its nullification. [Id]
The instructions and evidence of the Adult Authority'S
possible grant of parole invite speculative argument to the
jury and surmise by it of the possible improper release of a
defendant to society in the future; yet that matter does not
truly lie in its province but in the expert judgment of the
Adult Authority. In sum, the instructions foster the dual
vices of foisting upon the jury alien issues and concomitantly
diluting its own sense of responsibility.
Our rule is a minority one which we have only lately
adopted. One jurisdiction has reversed its former approval of
these instructions even though they had been given for a
longer period than here. These erroneous instructions should
be uprooted from our law before they become a verbal jungle
of error; planted in the jurors' minds, they bear their own
fruit of confusion.
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B. AlleGed errors in the Guilt trial.
1. Prosecutor's charGe of false testimony.
[8] The court did 110t crr in overruling a defense objection to the prosecutor's clJarge in oral argument that defend.
ant testified falsely. In view of defendant's conflicting statements, the prosecutor drew a legitimate inference from the
evidence that defendant falsely stated tllat during the week·
end of the crimes he had used dangerous drugs. Such infer·
ences, limited to the evidence adduced at trial, constitute
proper argument. (People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538, 562
[21 Cal.Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985] ; People v. Lopez (1913) 21
Cal.App. 188, 191 [131 P. 104] ; People v. Glaze (1903) 139
Cal. 154, 159.160 [72 P. 965].)
The prosecutor emphasized that defendant had told the
police that he had not been under the influence of drugs or
narcotics. At that time defendant volunteered "If I thought
it would do me any good in court I would tell you I was
really strung out." Subsequently defendant testified that on
the Saturday afternoon immediately preceding the erimes he
had obtained a quantity of dangerous dru/:,'S in Tijuana, llad
taken an excessive dosage, and would 110t have committed the
crimes if he had not been under the influence of the drugs.
Yet Jack Drummond, his companion on the Saturday in
question, testified that he and defendant had been together
most of the day; such testimony practically nullified defend·
ant's opportunity to leave the country to purchase the drugs.
The only testimony in support of defendant's contention
that he had obtained and consumed drugs that Saturday was
that of a fellow tankmate, facing trial for a felony narcotics
violation, who maintained that he and defendant had been in
.Tijuana. The prosecution, however, seriously impeached that
testimony. Under the circumstances, the prosecution merely
emphasized one reasonable interpretation of the evidence.
2. Instruction as to intoxication.
[9] The court refused to give defendant's requested in·
struction bascd upon People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 716,
727 [336 P.2d 492]. The instruction read as follows: "You
are further instructed that expert evidence of unconsciotlsness resulting from voluntary intoxication is received, not as
a 'complete defense' negating capacity to commit any crime,
but as a 'partial defense' negating specific mental state essential to a particular crime." (Italics added.) The court,
however, instructed the jury that: "Specific intent to kill is
not a necessary element of second degree murder, but is a
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necessary element of the kind of first dcgree murder described as willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. "
\Vithout passing' on the merits of the requested instruction,
we believe that the complete answer to defendant's contention lies in his failure to adduce expert evidence of unconsciousness reSUlting from voluntary iutoxication. In fact, the
opinion of the expert witness, as implemented by the testimony of defendant's acquaintances who observed his relevant beha\-ior, defeated any possible inference of defendant's
voluntary intoxication to the point of unconsciousness. Several witnesses testified that defendant's behavior in their
presence during the weekend in question appeared normal.
Dr. Lentz, WI10 later testificd as an expert witness for the
defense, had, as a court-appointed psychiatrist, submitted to
the court a report indicating that defendant's asserted intoxication from drugs during the weekend "although not exculpatory, might be considered mitigating." At the trial, however, he stated tlmt the benzedrine and barbiturate drugs
which defendant claimed to have taken would be incapable of
producing toxic psychosis and that unless defendant had
reached a degree of drug intoxication readily apparent to lay
observers he would remain capable of calculated judgment.
"People on the strl'et would be able to say, well, there was
something odd about tllis reaction. ... This state, or this
severity ... would surely sho,v to anybody." Dr. Lentz
further testified that in his opinion defendant, at the time of
the perpetration of the crimes, possessed the ability to premeditate and deliberate.
3. Instructions as to murder by means of lyinfJ in wait.
[10] Although defendant contends that the evidence did
not justify the eourt in instructing the jury that" All murder
which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait is murder in
the first degree," ample evidence supports this instruction;
defendant confessed to eonduct which justifies it.
The jury in its discretion could reject defendant's Wl'SiOll
of the criminal episode as described at the trial and accept,
instead, his earlier tape-record cd statements to the police.
Officer Morrison verified the transcript of the tape-recorded
statements as required for its introduction. (People v. Wojahn (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 135, 146 [337 P_2d 192] ; People
v. Wootan (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 481 [15 Cal.Rptr. 833].)
The tape recording and transcript were admissible evidence.
(People v. Stephens (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 6;):1, 660 [2:i()
P.2d 1033] ; People v. Wojahn, Sllpra, p. 146.) The trallscript
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implemented the tape reeol'lliug in those instances wlwre the
tape was unclear; this CO\ll·t has apPl'oved the above procedure ill previous deeisiolls. tPeople v. I(ctchcl (1963) 59 Cal.
2d 503, 519 [30 Cal.Hptr. 538, 3S1 P.2d 394] ; see also People
v. Dupree (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 60, 68 [319 P.2d 39] ; People v. Albert (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 729, 742 [6 Cal.Rptr.
473].)
Defendant, in his tape-recorded confession, stated tlmt he
picked up the rock in his front yard early Sunday morning
with the intent to kill someone. After his mother let him into
the house and they had each retired to their respective Sh~l'Ji
ing quarters, defendant called to her, perhaps saying" Hpy,
come here for a second." He waited in the dark of the bedroom corridor until she arose and opened her bedroom door;
then he struck her.
The instruction concerning murder by lying in wait appropriately stemmed from these events; the record affords
evidence of defendant's intention to kill and of his perpetration of his mother's murder by means of lying in wait for
the opportulle moment to strike. (See People v. Slttic (1953)
41 Ca1.2d 483, 492-493 [261 P.2d 241]; People v. Byrd
(1934) 42 Ca1.2d 200, 208-209 [266 P.2d 505] ; People v. Tltt/till (1947) 31 Ca1.2d 92, 99-101 [187 P.2d 16].)
4. Instruction as to reasonable doltbt as related to the degree
0/ the murder.
[11a] Because defendant addressed his argument prinripally to the question of first or second degree murder, he
maintains that the eourt should have specifically pointed the
instructions concerning reasonable doubt and circumstantial
evidence to the issue of degree. Defendant did not submit
instructions in this regard but nevertheless contends that
"By giving the circumstantial evidence instruction, said instruction discussed the fact of the defendant's right to
acquittal. Since this was not properly before the jury, it is
the defendant's contention that the instructions should haye
been made more understandable by relating them to the qUE'Stion of first or second degree." (Italics added.)
[12] Although in criminal cases the court must instruct
the jury on its own motion as to applicable general lei!al
principles, even though the parties fail to propose such instructions, the court need not render particular instructions
as to specific points unless the parties request them or they
are essential to a fair trial. (See People v. J ack.~on (1963) j!l
Cal.2d 375, 379-380 [29 Cal.Rptr. 505, 379 P.2<1 937] ; People
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v. Warren (1940) 16 Cal.2J 103, 116-117 [104P.2d 1024].)
rUb] Defendant's plea of not guilty remained before the
court; all matter ill cOlltrOYCrsy under that plea continued as
live issues before the jury. Likewise, instructions which embraced defendant's ,. right to acquittal" properly remainedl
before the jury. Neither the court nor defense counsel could
withdraw from the jury's consideration the question of defendant's innocence without his personal consent. (People v.
RUllers (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 301 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d\
892) .)
The general instructions as to circnmstantial evidence and!
reasonable doubt were, moreover, implemented by the follow-'i
ing instruction as to the degree of the crime: "When, upon
the trial of a charge of murder, the jury is convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, but has a reasonable doubt whether'
such murder was of the first or second degree, the jury must
give to such defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a
verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree." The
court thus apprised the jury that it should consider not
merely the issue of first degree murder or acquittal but that,
in determining the degree of the crime, it should give defendant the benefit of any doubt. We cannot, therefore, conclude that defendant suffered prejUdice in the court's instructions.
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to the penalty. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., and
Peek, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I would affirm
the judgment in its entirety, to wit: (a) finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and (b) fixing the
penalty at death.

